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A traditional paper-based passport contains a Machine-
Readable Zone (MRZ) and a Visual Inspection Zone (VIZ).
The MRZ has two lines of the holder’s personal data,
some document data, and verification characters encoded
using the Optical Character Recognition font B (OCR-
B). The encoded data includes the holder’s name, date of
birth, and other identifying information for the holder or
the document. The VIZ contains the holder’s photo and
signature, usually on the data page. However, the MRZ
and VIZ can be easily duplicated with normal document
reproduction technology to produce a fake passport which
can pass traditional verification. Neither of these features
actively verify the holder’s identity; nor do they bind
the holder’s identity to the document. A passport also
contains pages for stamps of visas and of country entry
and exit dates, which can be easily altered to produce fake
permissions and travel records. The electronic passport,
supporting authentication using secure credentials on a
tamper-resistant chip, is an attempt to improve on the
security of the paper-based passport at minimum cost. This
paper surveys the security mechanisms built into the first-
generation of authentication mechanisms and compares
them with second-generation passports. It analyzes and
describes the cryptographic protocols used in Basic Access
Control (BAC) and Extended Access Control (EAC).
Index Terms—ePassport, Electronic Passport, RFID, Security,
Contactless, EAC, BAC, MAC, PKI
I. INTRODUCTION
IN an effort to secure the borders of the United States ofAmerica, Congress has legislated requirements for Elec-
tronic Passports (ePassports) [16] for all visitors from countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) [4]. Any
passport issued by a participating state after October 2010
must be machine-readable with an electronic facial image
encoded on a secure chip. As a requirement of the US-VISIT
program [5], all visitors to the U.S. must have their photo,
and a fingerprint of their index finger, taken for electronic
comparison. In a reciprocal move, the U.S. has started issuing
electronic passports to its citizens from all domestic issuance
agencies since August 2007.
European Union countries have advanced to a second-
generation electronic passport. Countries like Germany,
France, and the Czech Republic have passports at the next
level, whereby biometric information is stored in a secure
passport chip. Similarly, Asian countries like Malaysia and
European Union (EU) countries have already advanced to
biometrics and Extended Access Control (EAC) like access
control. Any effort to make passports electronic and secure
requires adding hardware, firmware, and software at dif-
ferent levels to the existing verification infrastructure. The
centerpiece of the next generation of passport technology
lies in Java programmable secure controllers with advanced
cryptographic capabilities. An ePassport has an embedded
Radio Frequency Identification chip (RFID) with processing
capability for cryptographic computations. Unfortunately, the
wireless link between this passport tag, which is called chip in
the remainder of this paper, and a passport verification reader
can lead to security and privacy threats. Threat modeling
is based on first principles which analyzes compromise to
common security goals of any system.
II. THREAT MODEL FOR EPASSPORTS
Electronic passports [11] must prevent the known attacks
common to secure radio frequency-based identification and
access control systems. Comprehensive threat modeling and
designing countermeasures are key to the robustness of any
security system; ePassports are no different in this regard.
Each threat must have one or more mechanisms (or coun-
termeasures) built into the system. A security system can be
designed only to secure against known threats and attacks.
A threat is defined as a weak link in the system which can
be broken to compromise system’s security. A threat model
should be comprehensive enough to include all known attacks.
Threat and attack model will have overlaps, however this may
not be the case for every noted threat.
TABLE I
EPASSPORT THREAT MODEL
S.No. Security Threats Compromises
1. Forging Integrity
2. Repudiation Availability
3. Skimming Confidentiality
4. Cryptographic Analysis Confidentiality
& Integrity
5. Unauthorized System Authorization
6. Unauthorized User Verification
7. Privacy Threats Consent, verification
& authentication
8. Platform Integrity Integrity
2However, system may fail to secure against unknown threats
or those discovered after the design has been committed and
the product taken to field, side channel attacks [20] is example
of one of the threat which was not modeled and accounted for
in the design of early hardware security systems. Cryptog-
rapher these days are aiming to build systems which would
be safe to unknown attacks. A threat model for ePassports is
given in Table I. The left column shows known threats that
must have“antidotes” in the design to ensure that fundamental
security requirements are not violated. The right column shows
the requirement(s) at risk. System security, including passport
system security, comprises the following fundamental security
requirements: Secrecy - preventing system information from
flowing in unauthorized paths; Integrity - preventing unautho-
rized modification of system state; Legitimate Use - preventing
unauthorized use of system resources; Availability - preventing
unauthorized interference in the use of the system. Notice that
all of these issues involve the notion of authorization.
a) Forging: A passport can be forged by replacing a
complete chip with a different one. There are two cases of
such an attack. The first is replacement of a chip with a cloned
or duplicate LDS, the unprotected contents of an ePassport’s
Logical Data Structure. In this case, the duplicated passport
LDS matches that of an original electronic passport. This is a
cloning of a chip and its complete data set. The second case
is replacement of a chip with a tampered LDS. (A secure chip
generally has hardware mechanisms built-in to protect against
data alteration.) Forging clearly violates integrity.
b) Non-Repudiation: A non-repudiation attack concerns
an ePassport that has been tampered with to withhold informa-
tion embedded in its secure chip. The chip or its antenna could
be set to a state where it can not be read by a valid reader.
In such a scenario, the passport holder can not be verified
electronically. Due to the non-availability of the secure chip,
two situations emerge. The first is the failure to electronically
authenticate the passport. If the secure chip is not available, the
passport can not be authenticated and verified electronically.
The authentication must be performed by relying on MRZ
data. The second case that emerges is failure to verify the
passport holder. Due to the non-availability of the passport
chip, the holder’s biometrics and other data stored on the chip
may not be verified. If the passport holder’s biometrics are
stored only on the secure chip and not in a backend system,
the biometrics cannot be verified.
c) Skimming: The unprotected contents of an ePassport’s
LDS could be read by an unauthorized reader close enough to
the passport to use the wireless link. A skimmer could utilize
a reader which has been modified to read data from distances
greater than the passport designers anticipated.
d) Cryptographic Analysis: The cryptographic keys
stored in an ePassport chip could be exposed by deploying
mass computing power after gathering skimmed or eaves-
dropped data from different electronic passports. The keys
could be used to illicitly communicate with other passports.
e) Unauthorized System: A system may be authentic but
may not have the correct privileges to read information from
the passport.
f) Unauthorized User: Unauthorized user is anyone who
is not the person to whom the identity credentials had been
issued. Such a person misuses the identity documents by using
someone else’s information or appearance.
g) Privacy Threats: Privacy threats [17] are unapproved
use of personal information or tracking of the passport holder.
h) Platform Integrity: The platform on which appli-
cations run must be free from any malicious code which
can act as a Trojan Horse for the information stored in the
ePassport. Usually, such methods are added to the system for
the ease of testing during development and must be removed
to completely secure the system.
III. KNOWN ATTACKS FOR EPASSPORTS
Security mechanisms built into ePassports must counter the
specific known attacks shown in Table II. The attack profile
is as important as the threat profile.
TABLE II
EPASSPORT ATTACK MODEL
S.No. Known Attacks
1. Forging
2. Skimming
3. Eavesdropping
4. Illicit Verification
5. Data/Noise Injection
6. Impostor/False Biometrics
7. Rogue Reader/Hardware
8. Duplication/Cloning
9. Tracking
i) Forging: A passport can be forged by replacing its
complete chip with a different one. There are two such cases.
First, the chip is replaced with a cloned or duplicated LDS.
In this case, the chip on the duplicated passport matches the
data contents of the original ePassport. This is cloning of a
chip and its complete data set. Second, the chip is replaced
with a tampered LDS. A new chip, with a modified copy
of credentials is put in place of the original chip. Such a
modified secure chip is embedded into a passport from which
the original chip was removed. A secure chip has hardware
mechanisms built to protect against data alteration.
j) Skimming: An ePassport can be skimmed to read the
unprotected contents of its LDS. The skimmer may gather
sensitive details like the passport holder’s name, age, address,
and travel information. The skimmer could utilize readers
which are modified, extended, or rogue to read data from
distances greater than designed for.
k) Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping is an attack to in-
tercept communication between card and reader. The stolen
information could either be document or personal information
or system related cryptographic information which can be
replayed to illicitly communicate with other passports.
l) Illicit Verification: Illicit verifiers are like fake ATM(s)
installed at locations to falsely retrieve the PIN of a banking
card. The personal information could be skimmed if such a
system with copied keys is installed.
3m) Data/Noise Injection: A data injector is a device
which can manipulate or alter the data being sent by a secure
chip to a reader or vice versa. It can interject data with its own
data frames which may not only interfere with communication
but also alter add or subtract data exchanged between secure
reader and chip.
n) Imposter/False Biometrics: An impostor can fake the
biometrics of an authentic passport holder with methods like
wax fingers or face masks to fool the system. Impostors break
the security of a system by faking the identity of the actual
passport holder.
o) Rogue Reader/Hardware: A modified reader can be
used to read the contactless data from a card beyond it normal
operating range. Other modified hardware can store commu-
nications while legitimately communicating with a reader.
p) Duplication/Cloning: Cloning of a chip and duplica-
tion of its complete or partial data is an attack requiring so-
phisticated machinery and means. Such attacks are conducted
only by advanced attackers who have the finances to invest in
such systems.
q) Tracking: A tracker is a person who is only interested
in knowing where the passport holder is traveling. A tracker
may not have access to all the information which is stored
in the secure chip. The tracker is only interested to know the
whereabouts of a person. The tracker skims the data which
could be used to trace a passport holder’s location.
IV. AUTHENTICATION IN EPASSPORT SYSTEMS
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [6] has
defined two different mechanisms to authenticate secure chips
embedded in ePassports: active and passive authentication. In
active authentication, the secure controller processes crypto-
graphic information in the chip; in passive authentication, no
computation is involved and the contents of a tamper-proof
chip are read only by a verification device. Consequently,
passive authentication is implemented on secure memory
devices whereas active authentication requires a processor.
Lately, a new type of authentication for EAC, called Chip
Authentication has been proposed by European Union (EU)
[2]. Similar authentication was also proposed by some of the
far east countries, but this paper details only the EU proposal.
A. Passive Authentication
An ePassport’s document security object SOD is digitally
signed by issuing country at the time of personalization and
the certificate is stored in secure chip. Hash of each data
group (DG) is computed and stored in secure passport chip. In
Passive Authentication (PA), the inspection system first verifies
issuing country’s signed security data object [12] using public
keys stored in the inspection system. If the signature matches,
the hash of each data group is verified. By verifying hash
of data groups inspection system infers if the data has been
tampered. Certificate of document signer may be distributed
to visited country in lieu of storing it on the chip. Typically,
a visited country enters into an agreement with the issuing
country to obtain the certificate and distribute it at different
entry check points. Before checking the signature, validity of
signed certificate is verified by checking Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) for any updates. The revocation lists are regularly
updated in a secure but mutually agreed storage area known
as the Public Key Directory (PKD). The ePassport Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) symbols for passive authentication
are defined in Section E of the appendix.
1) Weaknesses: Passive authentication does not prevent
copying of chip data onto another chip, skimming, or unau-
thorized access to contents stored in the chip. The certificate
of a document signer from an issuing country is stored on
the secure chip. Reading a certificate from a secure chip to
authenticate and verify a signature is not a good security
practice, since it’s quite possible that the certificate was
revoked or it’s invalid. The verification device must check the
CRL while reading certificate from secure chip. For electronic
passports the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is stored in
PKD.
2) Strengths: An ePassport’s security object has provisions
to select hashing and signature algorithms. In case an algo-
rithm in use turns obsolete, either because of weakness or
otherwise, it can be switched to an alternate one. However,
passports which have already been issued can not be substi-
tuted with the latest algorithm. The ICAO specifications for
passive authentication have provisions for using larger key
lengths which improve cryptographic security. The choice of
a strong cryptographic algorithm for computing a hash of
data structures improves on possible collisions of signature
values. Passive authentication does not necessarily require the
verification device to be online except to get the updated CRL
from the PKD. This requires fewer infrastructure and can be
performed in a remote location.
B. Active Authentication
Active Authentication (AA) of electronic passports is per-
formed using a unique cryptographic key pair KPuAA and
KPrAA. The AA public key KPuAA is stored in Data Group
15 (DG15), one of 16 Data Groups (DGs), in the secure chip.
The private key is stored in secure chip and never leaves the
chip. Typically, an active authentication key pair is generated
inside the secure chip; however, many system designers prefer
creation of keys outside of the chip to improve personalization
speed. The correctness of an AA key is verified by checking
the signature of DG15, which is signed by passport signer’s
private key. To check signature, signer’s certificate should be
retrieved from PKD or from the chip, and the CRL checked
for updates. Visual inspection, electronic verification of the
security object, and challenge response authentication using
asymmetric key pair, determine if keys are read from a
passport which has not been copied or cloned. The chip also
stores signed MRZ information in the logical data structure
(LDS). Active authentication is designed to detect if a passport
chip has been replaced by a fake one or its contents have been
copied to another chip.
1) Challenge Response: The challenge response protocol
for AA is outlined below.
(a) The authentication device checks for validity of the
security object and retrieves the KPuAA either from
the chip or PKD.
4(b) Before using the key in this cryptographic protocol,
it checks for its validity by verifying the signature of
the key.
(c) The passport’s chip contains the secret authentication
private key KPrAA which is not accessible. The
certificate and public key KPuAA are stored on the
chip as well.
(d) The terminal generates a nonce and sends it to the
secure chip as a challenge. The verification device
may choose to send a date and time in addition to
the nonce, which can optionally be stored in the chip
upon signature.
Challenge = RVD → ePassport (1)
(e) The challenge, and at times an additional counter, is
signed by the authentication private key.
Response = Sign(RSA1)KPrAA(RVD + C)
(2)
(f) Verification device checks digital signature sent to it.
(g) If the signature is verified, the secure chip is actively
authenticated.
2) Key Lifetime: The authentication key pair is normally
valid for the lifetime of an ePassport. Typically, ePassports
are issued at least for five years or more. Therefore, the key
lifetime of an active authentication key pair is five years. The
strength of active authentication lies with the strength of the
secure chip to securely hold the private key. Secure controllers
with all the tamper-proofing mechanisms are strong key vaults.
3) Weaknesses: AA is designed to detect passports with
cloned chips. It requires a secure chip with cryptographic
capabilities, which may increase authentication time compared
to PA. However, with faster processing and better algorithms
this difference in time may not be noticeable. AA is usually
performed in combination with BAC, which uses diversified
keys that do not have high entropy. Use of AA with BAC
overcomes the strongest weakness of BAC. In AA, the same
key pair is used for every authentication session. There are
no temporal keys for every new session of authentication. AA
does not perform any type of external or terminal authentica-
tion. It assumes all terminals are trustworthy. This may not
be an issue since, unlike second generation passports, first
generation passports do not hold any private biometric data.
4) Strengths: Introducing an asymmetric key pair allows
signed trace and track information of visitors. An authenticated
time stamp using the private key, which is stored only in
the secure chip, allows system to be updated with trace
information regarding entry or exit of a visitor. The private
key is bound to the identity of person holding the ePassport.
AA could improve privacy since each access to the passport
can be logged in secure memory of the chip. The audit trail
could be helpful in tracing and tracking an illicit request to
access the passport. The AA public keys are signed and often
stored on the chip; therefore, it does not require verification
devices to be online.
1The signature with message recovery is defined in ISO 9796-2. Other
signature schemes like Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA per FIPS 186-3)
and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) could also be used
for the purpose.
CHIP AUTHENTICATION
Terminal Passport
Request PuPassport
−−−−−−−→
Read DG15
Verify Signature Signed[PuPassport]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Send
Send PuTerminal
−−−−−−−−→
Receive
Compute KSession Compute
Fig. 1. Messaging in Chip Authentication
C. Chip Authentication
Chip authentication is used in second generation ePassports
with BAC to improve security by introducing encryption of
all messages exchanged between the inspection system and
ePassport. In BAC with key diversification, the keys must
be generated using holder-specific data which may not have
high entropy. The active authentication and diversified keys
are not unique to each and every session. Chip authentication
improves these two authentication mechanisms by introducing
keys which are unique to every chip and every session.
Additionally, a message authentication code (MAC) is added
to every message from the chip. Like AA, it introduces
asymmetric key pair, signed, with public key of the issuing
country. In chip authentication, every chip has its own key
pair assigned and stored in it. The public key is signed and
stored in one of the public data groups and the private key is
stored in secure memory of the chip [21]. See Figure 1.
1) Ephemeral Static Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange: The ter-
minal chooses an ephemeral key pair which is used to encrypt
a single session of communication between the secure chip
and the interface device. The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key agreement scheme is chosen to agree upon
keys to encrypt data exchanged between chip and verification
device [21]. Subsequently, a symmetric key, 3DES is used
for encryption of all messages between the secure chip and
terminal. This improves weaknesses of key diversification
using static keys and PA challenge-response mechanisms. It
also improves asymmetric key challenge response used in
AA; the symmetric keys are used to encrypt messages. The
following is a conceptual outline of chip authentication.
(a) An elliptic curve and corresponding public curve
point P is chosen for a given field and shared between
the passport chip and verification device.
(b) The verification device generates a random number
which is its private key. The passport’s key, and
private keys kp and kv , are stored in the chip.
(c) Both generate public keys Qp and Qv and send them
to each other.
Q =
{
Qp = kpP
Qv = kvP
(d) The chip and the verification device generate com-
5mon shared data Qs using each other’s public key.
Qs =
{
kpQv = kpkvP
kvQp = kvkpP
(e) After the above step, Qs becomes the shared sym-
metric key for any encryption of any subsequent
communication between the chip and the verification
device. There are many different forms of the ECDH
protocol, each with its merits. Menezes Qu Vanstone
(MQV), another form of ECDH, has additional secu-
rity mechanisms built in. An ePassport uses one of
the forms of ECDH to perform the key agreement.
2) Weaknesses: Chip authentication requires high-end pro-
cessors which can perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Stan-
dard interfaces for Diffie-Hellman key exchange are available
only in Java Card 2.2.x.
3) Strengths: Chip authentication covers all the weaknesses
with the different schemes mentioned above. Along with mes-
sage authentication as defined for BAC, chip authentication is
the strongest known authentication mechanism.
TERMINAL AUTHENTICATION
Terminal Passport
Send PrCV CASigned[PuDVCA]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify DVCA
Certificate
Send PrDV CASigned[PuIS]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify IS
Certificate
Sign Challenge
←−−−−−−−
Send
Send PrISSigned[Challenge]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify
Receive GrantAccess←−−−−−−−−− Verify Access
Fig. 2. Messaging in Terminal Authentication
D. Terminal Authentication
The second generation ePassport introduces concept of
terminal rights and their authentication using asymmetric
cryptography. In EAC [2], holder’s biometrics are stored on
the chip. The holder’s biometrics should not be released to
terminals which do not have rights to read the information. A
secure chip has no power source, so can not maintain time.
Due to this limitation, the chip can not verify standard X.509
certificates. The secure chip in an electronic passport has
limited access to the network, and therefore can not reliably
update itself from the CRL. To overcome these limitations, a
different type of certificate, known as a ’card/chip verifiable’
certificate is used for external authentication.
The terminal is authenticated if an asymmetric key pair
is verified. The terminal stores private key of key pair and
ePassport stores the public key, which is embedded with
other information in a certificate, known as Card Verifiable
Certificate (CVC). The CVC is securely stored to the ePassport
at the time of personalization. The knowledge of private key in
the terminal is verified by an asymmetric challenge response
protocol. See Figure 2.
To authenticate the terminal, the ePassport sends a chal-
lenge to the verification device, which has access to the
corresponding private key. The verification device attaches
document number, challenge, and hash of the session-unique
data and signs it with its private key. Either the RSA or
ECDSA signature algorithm is used to sign and verify. The
terminal contains its private key either in tamper-resistant
memory or on the connected network from where it can be
securely fetched. The chip contains ’trust anchor’ or ’root
certificate’ which is used to verify signature received from
the terminal. Built-in with authentication are access rights to
read or update biometrics of the passport holder. Terminal
authentication is preceded by internal chip authentication. As
described above, chip authentication concludes with a mutu-
ally agreed symmetric key which envelops all the subsequent
communication between ePassport and verification terminal.
All messages are encrypted and attached with MAC computed
as per specifications of Chip Authentication.
Fig. 3. PKI for Terminal Authentication
1) PKI for Terminal Authentication: Figure 3 illustrates the
two-level PKI necessary for terminal authentication. Country
Verifying CA (CV CAIssuer) issues certificate to document
verifying CA (DVCAIssuer). The document verifying CA
issues terminal certificates to each and every verification
terminal deployed in the location.
Fig. 4. PKI for Terminal Authentication with Cross Certification
Terminal verification extends beyond the boundaries of an
issuing country. Cross certification allows foreign countries to
verify the identity of the passport holder using biometrics. The
CV CAIssuer certifies visited country’s document verifying
6CA (DV CAV isit). The terminals at visited country now have
signatures of the issuing country CA which can be verified
by electronic passports from the issuing country. Figure 4
represents the PKI for cross certification.
2) Access Rights: EAC introduces access rights to verifi-
cation terminals allowing only authorized terminals to read or
modify certain data. The terminal’s application has controlled
access to different biometrics stored on the chip. Role-based
access right mechanisms are implemented by encoded tables in
card-verifiable terminal certificates. Such access right control
mechanisms are used to limit or grant access to perform read
or update operations. The card-verifiable certificates have been
defined to contain privileges for different roles. Different roles
include certificate authority, foreign country, and domestic
inspection systems. Germany has chosen to implement such a
system [21].
3) Weaknesses: Terminal authentication can not revoke a
certificate once it has been issued to a country or an organiza-
tion. Once issued, there is no known way to revoke a certificate
using mechanisms like CRL and time.
4) Strengths: Terminal authentication adds terminal authen-
tication and access rights to the facility of authentication,
which is useful in controlling access to the biometrics stored
inside the chip.
V. ACCESS CONTROL IN EPASSPORT SYSTEMS
Access control using data stored in a secure chip is defined
for various levels of classification by the issuing country. The
U.S. had chosen Plain Access Control2 (PAC) as the primary
method to control access. However, this was later changed to
BAC after skimming and eavesdropping concerns were raised
by different privacy groups. ICAO mandates storage of only
a facial image in the chip; other biometrics, like fingerprints,
are not stored in the chip, which limits the use of biometrics
for access control. Mutual authentication of a secure chip and
a verification device is optional. These limitations have been
removed in EAC, which is better suited for biometrics-based
access control at the verification point.
TABLE III
OPTIONAL AND MANDATORY SECURITY MECHANISMS
Mechanism Mandatory/Optional
Passive Authentication ICAO Mandatory
BAC ICAO Optional, EU Mandatory
Active Authentication Issuing Country
EAC EU Mandatory for biometrics
A. Plain Access Control
PAC is a special case of BAC, in which key diversification
is not required to read the data. This scheme of access control
allows any reader to read data from a chip. The secure data
object is hashed, signed, and stored in the LDS. Authenticity
2Plain Access Control (PAC) is a term coined only in this paper by the
author and may be viewed as special case of BAC. Per ICAO, BAC has
mandatory document signing but the key diversification to read the data stored
in chip is optional.
of a passport is verified by checking the authenticity of data
and its signature via a signed object. According to ISO 14443,
read range is limited to 10 cm; however, the data can be
skimmed using modified readers that achieve a range greater
than 10 cm. Therefore, PAC does not counter skimming and
eavesdropping types of attacks. PAC may be secure for con-
tact only communication; however, contactless communication
introduces risks and mere signature verification is inadequate
security. See Table III.
1) Security Weaknesses:
a) Confidentiality: The data is unencrypted and can be
read by any reader. There is no confidentiality of data and this
scheme allows any reader to read the data [15].
b) Authentication: Any reader can read the data encoded
on the chip. There is no security mechanism to authenticate
the reader, passport holder, or the secure chip.
c) Data Cloning: The data can be easily read and written
to another chip without any modification.
B. Basic Access Control
Per ICAO, BAC is an optional but recommended way
to achieve interoperability of ePassport-based border control
between countries since the European Union mandated diversi-
fied key authentication. The diversified key is generated, using
MRZ data, and used to mutually authenticate the passport and
inspection devices. Since common knowledge is required to
generate the diversified keys, this scheme implicitly authen-
ticates the inspection system; however, mutual authentication
is not strong. In BAC, data between inspection or verification
reader is not encrypted using the session keys. An ePassport
could be authenticated using either active or passive authenti-
cation.
The mandatory and optional stages of BAC are listed below.
1) Key Diversification [Optional]: BAC diversified key au-
thentication and opening of an unencrypted communi-
cation channel is an optional but suggested method to
authenticate the ePassport and inspection device.
2) Passive Authentication [Mandatory]: Passive authentica-
tion and checking of the signature is a mandatory step
in BAC. Passive authentication verifies authenticity of
the data only.
3) Active Authentication [Optional]: Active Authentication,
as described above, is an optional step in BAC.
1) Key Diversification: The fixed seed key is diversified
using the passport number, date of birth, and expiration date
of the document. Key diversification creates a unique key
for each passport; however, keys are diversified using known
data which is not random and therefore has low entropy. A
true random number can not be known to both the inspection
system and the secure chip without doing one of the following.
• Use a back-end system to store a known secret random
number. The same number can be stored in the card.
• Exchange the random number as part of a setup message.
However, this must be passed in the clear, which weakens
security.
• Use a known but secret coding algorithm to generate the
same codes. A known algorithm could be used to generate
7a pseudo random number. However, this is not a good
approach since a secret black box algorithm could be
broken.
2) Session Key Derivation: BAC uses two keys, one for
encryption and another for calculating the message authenti-
cation code being exchanged between reader and secure chip.
Sessions keys are generated using a seed key derived using
the data read from the MRZ.
1) The passport contains Kseed,MRZData, CEnc and
CMAC . The session keys are derived from seed key and
personal data stored in MRZ.
Kseed CMAC
MRZData CENC
2) The seed key Kseed is diversified using data stored in
the MRZ.
MRZData⊗Kseed → Kdiv
3) The Kdiv is concatenated with 32-bit counters. One for
encryption and the other for MAC.
D =
{
KEnc ⇐ Kdiv||CEnc,
KMAC ⇐ Kdiv||CMAC
4) Next, a message digest is generated on key set D. SHA-1
is calculated on both the keys defined in key set D, now
called H. This is a 160-bit or a 20-byte long number.
H =
{
HEnc ⇐ SHA(KEnc),
HMAC ⇐ SHA(KMAC)
5) The first 56 bits of H constitutes K(a) and checksum
is calculated per the DES algorithm. The computed
checksum is appended to the key to make it 64 bits
long.
H → Ka
6) The next 56 bits from the 64th bit of H constitutes K(b)
and a checksum is calculated per the DES algorithm. The
computed checksum is appended to the key to make it
64 bits long.
H → Kb
7) The last 20 bits or four bytes of H are discarded with
no affect.
8) The challenge response messaging occurs to verify the
passport as per ISO 11770-2 using 3DES in block-cipher
mode.
9) Random numbers (nonces) generated by the passport
and the reader are of eight bytes long.
The keys generated are valid from the start to the end of
communication between the verification device and ePassport.
The lifetime of the document signing key is equal to the
longest time for which the passport is valid plus time for
which the key has been used to sign other passports. The
document-signing key is erased once the key has expired.
Countries choose the frequency at which a new document-
signing certificate is issued.
3) Challenge Response: The message sequence for chal-
lenge response is summarized below. The nonce is eight bytes
or 64 bits long.
1) The verification device generates a random number Rv
and encrypts with the triple DES keys generated.
Mvp = 3DES(Kab(Rv))
2) The passport decrypts it and verifies if the random
number matches. Rvencrypts with the triple DES keys
generated.
Rv = 3DES
−1(Kab(Rv))
3) Passport generates a random number Rp encrypts with
the triple DES keys.
Mpv = 3DES(Kab(Rp))
4) The verification device decrypts the challenge and veri-
fies if the random number matches. Rpencrypts with the
triple DES keys generated.
Rp = 3DES
−1(Kab(Rp))
4) Message Authentication: Every message between pass-
port and reader can be appended with a Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC). The MAC is calculated per the ISO
9797-1 MAC algorithm. The MAC is calculated using the DES
algorithm with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). For all blocks
except BN−1, Ka is used for encryption. For every block,
an incremental counter is appended to the message to make
its MAC unique. This technique works well against message
replay attacks, which are common in wireless communication.
Note that the next to last block is encrypted using Kb instead
of Ka.
5) Security Weaknesses:
a) Key Generation: Both the encryption and the MAC
key are generated from the same seed key. Although there are
additional counters attached to generate the encryption and
MAC keys, the compromise of one single key Kseed could
be sufficient to break the encryption as well as the message
authentication code. Note that the counter is only an additional
number incremented by one. To overcome this threat, the
counters can be easily replaced by a random number which
can be either encrypted or attached to the message.
b) Key Diversification: The seed key Kseed is diversified
using the passport holder’s name and date of birth, or the keys
are diversified using the passport’s information which can be
easily read from the data page of the passport. The entropy of
the diversification information is limited and the diversification
information is available in the data page of the passport. This
data in most cases is encoded in the machine-readable zone.
Despite the use of the SHA 200 hashing algorithm, the key
generated may not be truly random.
c) Cryptographic Algorithm: The choice of crypto-
graphic algorithm has been DES, a well known and proven
standard for symmetric encryption/decryption of data. How-
ever, with Rijndael’s algorithm already announced as the AES,
the choice of DES does not seem appropriate. AES has already
been designed into some networking and banking protocols.
8AES’s stronger substitution permutation network structure and
the fact that it can be implemented well on a medium- or
small-sized chip, like the one used for passports, makes it a
better candidate than DES. The lack of adoption of AES in the
ePassport standards should probably be revisited sometime.
d) Chip and Data Cloning: The secure chip can not
be easily protected against a clone attack. A cloned chip is
assumed to have copied all data bit-wise and replicated to
similar silicon. Detection of such clones is a challenge which
industry is presently facing. The anti-cloning solution may lie
beyond the secure chip is some special type of printing or
material that is added to passports.
C. Extended Access Control
Following rollout of U.S. passports, the EU came up with its
set of passport identification standards and security protocols
[2] [26]. EAC is designed for a second generation of passports
which involves storing biometrics of the holder. The common
biometrics used are either finger prints or iris images. Terminal
Authentication is being implemented by EU countries with
some country-specific extensions. EAC keys are exchanged
bilaterally between the issuing and visited state. The signed
certificates must be available to the verification device for
reading biometric information stored on the secure chip.
EAC replaces active authentication by chip authentication.
As per [28], an EAC mutual authentication session consists of
the following stages with mandatory and optional parts.
1) BAC [Mandatory for all Passports]: Establishes a secure
channel with diversified keys.
2) Chip Authentication [Mandatory for Second Genera-
tion Passports]: EAC replaces active authentication by
mandatory chip authentication.
3) Passive Authentication [First Generation Passports]: Pas-
sive authentication is performed as per ICAO 9303
specifications.
4) Terminal Authentication [Mandatory for Second Gener-
ation Passports]: EAC adds terminal authentication to
mutual authentication. All terminals are not trusted by
the passport, as is the case for first generation passports.
EAC message exchange consists of two stages: chip au-
thentication followed by terminal authentication. The chip
is “deduced” to be verified at the beginning of the second
stage since it is able to encrypt and decrypt messages using
session keys negotiated in the first stage. The session keys
are established in the chip authentication stage. The first stage
consists of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman or Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. The terminal authentication stage consists of
signature verification using either RSA or ECDSA.
1) Security Weaknesses:
a) Card Verifiable Certificates: EAC involves use of
card-verifiable certificates which are not standard. Unlike
X.509 and PGP certificates, such non-standard certificates are
not widely deployed. There have been limited implementations
[25] of verification of X.509 certificates on smart card chips.
A card-verifiable certificate can not be revoked or its validity
checked with time since cards do not have a clock. This
weakness limits the effectiveness of security mechanisms
based on card-verifiable certificates.
b) Loss of Verification Terminal: In extended authentica-
tion schemes, a private key is stored in the terminal; therefore
any theft or loss of a verification terminal could jeopardize
the security of all passports using the corresponding public
key. This could possibly mean a breach of security; however,
to overcome this weakness, tamper-resistance mechanisms
should be deployed to secure the storage of keys and sensitive
information.
VI. BIOMETRICS
Facial images and fingerprints are the most useful biomet-
rics for ePassports [10]. Biometrics add another dimension to
the authentication of ePassports by allowing checks for “what
you have” and “what you are” at the same time. Biometrics
can help to move from manned border crossing stations to
unmanned border verification stations. The automated ver-
ification of credentials was first implemented by Malaysia
and followed by Australia. Brazil has decided to roll out its
ePassports with all ten fingerprints and a facial image encoded
on the chip.
Many countries use biometrics for law enforcement, using
a one-to-many search-and-match to identify criminals. Since
criminals often try to cross country borders, having similar
mechanisms such as FIPS 201 or Personal Identity Verification
(PIV) is useful for ePassports. A one-to-many comparison
requires additional storage and computing for quick results.
This can be achieved only by letting the minutiae out of
the secure chip and matching them to the database of foul
fingerprints. EAC grants or denies access based on biometric
information stored in the secure chip. Just like electronic
signatures, a biometrics template is unique to the passport
holder, and therefore raises different privacy concerns about
the distribution of template information. Storing biometrics
securely in the secure chip with access control is the best way
to maximize security and privacy concerns. As per ICAO, the
facial image of a passport holder is not sensitive or secret
biometric data. A facial image is used in BAC for personal
identification and therefore it is not encrypted. Table IV shows
provisions available in electronic passports for additional bio-
metrics like an iris or retinal image and visual marks.
TABLE IV
EPASSPORT BIOMETRICS
Name Classification
Facial Image Public
Encoded Finger Private
Encoded Iris/Retina Private
Visual Mark Private
Signature Private
A. Electronic Verification
Electronic verification is possible only if the passport holder
is present and the verification station has the necessary devices
to capture the biometric data of the passport holder. If the bio-
metrics data is encrypted, it must be decrypted after generating
9the diversified keys which are calculated only after reading
the MRZ. The biometrics of the passport holder are captured
using a capturing station and biometrics sensor and matched
against those stored on the secure chip. ICAO specifications
do not mandate a comparison of biometrics on the secure
chip, commonly know as “match on chip” Since the match
is typically done on the verification device, to secure the
verification the biometrics should be encrypted since they will
travel wirelessly.
Besides the risk of losing minutiae to an illegitimate ter-
minal, the verification of fingerprints at an unmanned station
introduces the ’gelatin finger’ or ’prosthetic finger’ threat. The
threat of introducing a prosthetic or gelatin finger with ridges
as per stolen images of an individual can not be easily miti-
gated. The author can propose reading more than one finger
to reduce the chances of such a threat succeeding. Enrolling
all ten fingers on the chip and randomly selecting the finger to
verify helps improve security. The security against this threat
also improves if more than one fingerprint of the individual
is verified. Extending this logic, if both the finger and facial
biometrics are stored on the chip and electronically verified
at the unmanned station, the gelatin finger threat is mitigated.
Experts have argued that the facial images could also be easily
found and replicated to fool the facial recognition systems;
however, security with “dual checks” should be an acceptable
level of security.
B. Terminal Verification
All terminals are usually not granted access to read the
biometric templates stored on the card. Some countries like
Germany have designed their systems to validate the access
rights of terminals to read the template before exposing
templates to them. Terminal authentication is performed and
the access bits decoded to check for the access rights.
VII. PROTECTION PROFILES
Common criteria profiles [19] [18] have been defined for
each type of ePassport access control. Most of the hardware,
embedded software, manufacturing process and issuance, and
handling systems are evaluated to meet high degrees of assur-
ances. The two different protection profiles cover threats as
perceived by the developers of such profiles. The protection
profiles may be comprehensive but may not be complete. An
example of such a threat is a side-channel attack. Protection
against such an attack has been built in most of the secure
controllers.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Since ePassports are being issued in place of traditional
paper passports, which do not have secure RF-enabled con-
tactless chips, the security of ePassports must be better than
paper-based passports, which are not vulnerable to skimming,
eavesdropping, or tracking attacks. This is an unwritten and
probably unrealized expectation from the issuing countries,
passport holders, and society. The world is seeing the first few
generations of RFID passports. The convenience and security
of contactless access control transactions are here to stay.
The second generation passport with biometric access control
will be more prevalent in the coming years. The future of
passports may shift from single-chip electronic RF to multi-
chip modules with a combined data storage capacity from
multiple chips. Future ePassports may look like a secured
solid disk with onboard sensors and limited or no printed
information. This would be a true generation shift from paper
electronic to fully electronic passports. Such a passport may
have its own sensors on board to validate its holder. Some other
interesting security features like RF-DNA [30] [29] can be
used as certificates of authenticity in lieu of electronic certifi-
cates. These methods rely on physical creation of fingerprints
which would identify each passport. See Table V.
TABLE V
GENERATIONS OF PASSPORT
Generation Type
Generation 0 MRZ
Generation 1 BAC + PA, EA
Generation 2 EAC + TA, CA
Generation 3 eVisas
Generation 4 Advanced Electronics
APPENDIX
A. Construction
1) Inlay: The tamper-proof chip embedded in a passport is
connected to a coil and made into an inlay which is inserted
on either the cover or first page of a machine-readable travel
document (MRTD). The term MRTD refers to ePassports
as well as other travel authorization documents including
visas and permits for entry. The inlay is usually composed
of different layers of synthetic polymers which protect the
coil, chip, and more importantly the interconnect. The most
important of all components is a secure RF-enabled tamper-
proof chip which allows reading of data while securely storing
it. An ePassport’s physical construction is required to last for
at least 10 years. The physical construction should be strong
enough to survive the pressure and temperature that it could
be subjected to in those years [28].
The construction of a passport consists of layers of lami-
nated poly-carbonate or polyester (PET/PETG) or some other
material which is a combination of similar materials [3]. The
inlay is usually 300-480 µm thick, depending on the thickness
of the silicon. The dimensions of the inlay are about 600 x
400 mm in length and width. The chip is made into a module
before bonding the antenna to the module. Often, layers of
different materials are used to strengthen the composition
of the inlay. An inlay goes through numerous test cycles,
including the ISO 10373 physical, temperature, magnetic,
electric, and chemical tests. Besides this, an inlay must go
through another important test known as the high-pressure
impact or “stamping” test. Since passports are often stamped,
they need to survive the stamping impact stress.
2) Antenna: The antenna is typically made of copper or
some other alloy of copper to construct a coil with the right
attenuation and RF characteristics. The antenna dimensions
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Fig. 5. Directions for Measuring Attenuation
of a passport are specified in ISO 7810 ID-1. The size of
such an antenna is between 85.60 and 53.98 mm (3.370 to
2.125 in). The number of turns in the coil is not specified
but left to the antenna designer. The same goes for material
used to manufacture the antenna. The electrical and magnetic
characteristics of the magnetic field are specified in ISO
14443.
3) RF Shield: An RF shield is a mesh of electro-
magnetically opaque material, usually put on the cover of a
passport to avoid skimming and eavesdropping [1]. The shield,
also known as a “Faraday Cage”, is often in the form of a
pouch or cover on the passport [22]. The shield offers -40 to
-60 dB attenuation in the frequency band around 13.56 MHz
to limit skimming or eavesdropping. This level of attenuation
is perceived to block the communicating signals between a
passport and interrogating readers. An RF shield is not fully
effective in blocking communication between a reader and a
passport. A reader with strong signal can be designed that
could nullify attenuation provided by an RF shield when the
ePassport is open and the shield is not effective. Shield is
less effective if it is placed in the cover page and the cover
page is opened. The shield provides some safety but not the
surety of blocking communication between a passport and a
rogue-interrogating reader. It should not be relied upon as
the sole mechanism to avoid such attacks. The exact methods
of measuring the attenuation of electro magnetic shielding is
defined in [22]. For a geometry of the ID1 format, attenuation
should be calculated at all six sides and preferably at regular
angular intervals of inclination. The different directions of
measurement are illustrated in Figure 5.
4) The Secure Chip: The secure chip module is usually
smaller than 20 mm2. Of six pins of a secure chip, only two
are connected to the antenna. Other pads that are not used
must be secured against probing attacks. The contactless air
interface could be either Type A or B. Per ICAO, the minimum
size of available persistent non-volatile memory on the chip
should not be less than 30 kB. Chips with 30 kB of available
data space, are sufficient only for storing a minimal set of
mandatory biometrics and can be used only for first-generation
ePassports. Higher capacity chips are required for countries
intending to store visas and travel information on the passport.
The writable information on a chip includes data groups
DG17, DG18, and DG19. The significance of each data group
is explained in Section B below. In such cases, the minimum
size of persistent non-volatile memory must be greater than
256 kB. The chip should be capable of generating random
numbers and performing at least DES/3DES cryptographic
operations like encryption, hashing, and signing for BAC. The
chip must be capable of performing asymmetric cryptographic
operations like Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange for
EAC.
5) Radio Frequency: All ePassports are specified to work
only at 13.56 MHz for the advantages of high-frequency
communication over low frequency. The 13.56 MHz com-
munication band is more immune to processor noise, noise
from the earth’s field, and the surrounding environment, which
is necessary for stable and consistent RF communication.
The RF communication is based on ISO 14443 standards
developed for near-field inductively coupled systems. ICAO
defines communication to be either Type A or Type B. ICAO
has additional test standards for stronger adherence to field
strengths and modulation indices. Also defined are strong test
criteria for its qualifications.
B. Logical Data Structure
To achieve interoperability, the LDS of electronic passports
is defined by an ICAO standard. The data structure has various
mandatory or optional components. Data groups DG 1-16 are
written by the issuing country; data groups DG 17-19 are
written by a receiving country.
1) Mandatory Issuing State or Organization Data: The
mandatory encoded LDS is shown in Table VI. This includes
two data groups DG1 and DG2.
TABLE VI
MANDATORY LOGICAL DATA
Location Group Type
MRZ + Chip DG1 Holder and Passport Info.
Data Page + Chip DG2 Encoded Face of Holder
TABLE VII
ISSUING STATE OR ORGANIZATION LOGICAL DATA
Name Data
DG3-DG7 Holder’s Biometrics
DG8 Data Feature(s)
DG9-DG14 Structure Feature(s)
DG10 Substance Feature(s)
DG11-DG14 Additional Info / RFU
DG15 Active Authentication Key Info
DG16 Person to Notify
2) Optional Logical Data: The optional LDS which can be
encoded is shown in Table VII.
C. Electronic Passport Public Key Infrastructure
An ePassport requires a PKI for every issuing country and
a cross state (central) repository to exchange any updates.
A PKI is required even for BAC and passive authentication
of ePassports. Every issuing country has its own Country
Signing Certificate Authority (CSCA) and Country Verifying
Certificate Authority (CVCA). A CSCA’s public signature key
is denoted as KPuCSCA and its private signature key is
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KPrCSCA. A CVCA’s public signature key is denoted as
KPuCVCA and its private signature key is KPrCV CA.
A CSCA issues certificates to the document signer which
are used to sign the LDS. The document signer’s public key is
denoted as KPuDS and the private key is KPrDS . A CVCA
issues certificates to a Document Verifier (DV), which may or
may not be the same entity as the document signer. For active
authentication, an additional key pair is added. This key pair
is only used in a challenge response to actively authenticate
the ePassport chip. The public active authentication key is
denoted as KPuAA and the private key is denoted as KPrAA.
The authenticity of an ePassports is verified by the document
verifier. The issuing country can revoke certificates and have
a need to update the CRL and set of document verification
certificates. These certificates are normally stored in a common
shared and secure repository, which is regularly scanned for
updates.
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